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On Criminalizing Violent Speech
Amitai Etzioni*

A BSTRACT
There is an increasingly high number of threats to kill, made by
citizens against each other, and against public officials. These threats
terrorize people, force them to take protective measures, make them
reluctant to assume public office, and, when they do, make them feel as
though they have to act cautiously. State and federal laws currently exist
that prohibit such threats. This article examines the ways the courts have
affected how these laws function. It concludes by suggesting ways these
laws can be rendered more effective. Drawing on liberal
communitarianism, this article seeks to offer practical recommendations
for how the U.S. can adequately respond to our current historical
circumstance—namely, one where public officials and lay people are
receiving an increasing number of violent threats.

I NTRODUCTION
For persons without legal training, it may seem obvious that a person
cannot threaten to cause bodily harm to another person or threaten to kill
them and get away with such threats. Moreover, persons without legal
training would tend to assume that threatening to kill an elected official
for the way they voted, or calling on compatriots to go and hang, say, Mike
Pence, surely would be legally prohibited.1 Many free speech advocates,
in contrast, may argue that such statements are merely expressions of one’s
viewpoint and feeling. Additionally, such advocates may suggest that no
harm was actually inflicted, that words should not be banned, and that
surely words should not be subject to punishment by the state. This view
is captured in an often-cited children’s chant: sticks and stones may break
* I am indebted to Ismene Vedder for extensive research assistance and editorial comments
on this article.
1. Martin Pengelly, ‘Hang Mike Pence’: Twitter Stops Phrase Trending after Capitol Riot,
THE GUARDIAN, (Jan. 10, 2021, 12:21 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jan/10/hangmike-pence-twitter-stops-phrase-trending-capitol-breach; Pence ‘Proud’ of his Jan 6 Actions Despite
Criticism from Trump, REUTERS (Jun. 25, 2021,4:37 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/penceproud-his-jan-6-actions-despite-criticism-trump-2021-06-25/.
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my bones, but words will never hurt me. The law itself is far from clear on
this matter, as we shall see. This article suggests that deliberations as to
whether or not threats to kill should be protected by the First Amendment
would benefit from drawing on a liberal communitarian framework.
The subject at hand, the threat to kill, is a form of speech. Americans
consider freedom of speech to be one of the most cherished individual
rights. The Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to allow speech that
many would consider unworthy of constitutional protection. For example,
in 1977, the Court ruled that neo-Nazi groups have a First Amendment
right to march through a Jewish community.2 In 1989, the Court ruled that
burning the American flag is protected by the First Amendment.3 And, in
2011, the Court ruled that the Westboro Baptist Church had the
constitutional right to scream homophobic slurs at a U.S. Marine’s funeral
on public property.4 While other democracies have banned hate speech,
the U.S. Congress and state legislatures have demurred. However, the
Court has emphasized time and again that “the right of free speech is not
absolute at all times and under all circumstances,” and it has maintained
the right to delineate between constitutionally protected and unprotected
speech.5 For example, the Court has defined some “well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech” that fall outside the protections of the
First Amendment, like “the lewd and obscene, the profane, [and] the
libelous.”6 The subject of this article is the question of whether threats to
kill should be added as a class of banned speech.
This article first introduces the social philosophy of liberal
communitarianism. In Section II, the article reviews the existing federal
statutes governing the making of threats. Section III examines major,
relevant Supreme Court and lower court cases. Section IV reviews another
area of relevant Supreme Court precedent: fighting words. Section V
provides recent examples of a wave of threats to kill, which seem to be
rising in frequency. The article concludes by providing prescriptive
recommendations for ways to improve the deterrence of such threats. It
cannot be stressed enough that this is not a review article; no attempt is
made to review all the relevant cases and laws. A selection of key cases,
the author suggests, will suffice to indicate the current state of affairs and
what changes seem to be called for.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
Id. at 571−72.
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I. L IBERAL C OMMUNITARIANISM , A B RIEF O VERVIEW
Liberal communitarianism seeks to combine two fundamentally
opposing theories, liberalism and communitarianism. Liberalism and
communitarianism maintain different conceptions of the role of moral
reasoning in public spaces and political bodies, and, therefore, these two
theoretical frameworks oftentimes produce opposing political
prescriptions.
Liberalism, with its emphasis on rational thought and the autonomy of
the individual, posits that every person can and should develop their own
conception of the good and that the state should be morally neutral. For
liberal societies, morality is a private matter. The main scholars
responsible for the revival of liberal philosophy in the second half of the
20th century are Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman on the right
and John Rawls on the left.7 In contrast, communitarianism posits that
communities should come together in public spaces to define the good in
terms of core shared values. Reemerging in the 1980s as a critique of
contemporary liberalism, communitarian social philosophy holds that
individualism leads to the atomization of society, harming members who
need social bonding. Ultimately, communitarianism concludes that a
flourishing society requires individual commitments to the common good
(in other words, social responsibility). The main scholars who contributed
to the communitarian social philosophy include Charles Taylor, Michael
Sandel, Shlomo Avineri, Seyla Benhabib, William A. Galston, and Amitai
Etzioni.8
Communitarianism has an authoritarian branch, as seen in the social
conditions of Singapore and Japan. This kind of communitarianism
maintains that individuals are to be viewed as cells of an organic body,
whose main contributions and meaning are attained through their service
to the communal whole, including both the local community and that of
the nation. Social pressure is a main way that individuals are held in line.
Some authoritarian societies draw heavily on the state for enforcement of
their values; in all, social bonds and pressures to conform to norms play a
7. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
8. See CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND “THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION” (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1992); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); MICHAEL
J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996);
COMMUNITARIANISM AND INDIVIDUALISM (Shlomo Avineri & Avner de-Shalit eds., 1992); SEYLA
BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS (2004); WILLIAM A.
GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY
AND PRACTICE (2002).
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key role. Japan, for example, has some authoritarian elements and still
makes short shrift of the rights of women, ethnic minorities, LGBTQ+
people, and people with disabilities.9
Untethered, both liberalism and communitarianism fail to fulfill
fundamental precepts of democracy. Liberalism fails to maintain the
mutual respect and bonds among citizens that are required for reasoned
debate and the formation of shared normative understandings—the basis
of shared policies—whereas communitarianism fails to protect individual
rights.
Liberal communitarianism assumes from the outset that a society
ought to treat both individual rights and the common good as basic moral
principles and that neither should be assumed to a priori trump the other.
It does not overlook the fundamentally incompatible nature of liberalism
and communitarianism; rather, it seeks to embrace their incompatibilities,
as one’s strength is the other’s deficiency. Liberal communitarians
recommend a constant balancing of the two sets of moral principles,
requiring legislators and citizens alike to weigh the common good against
individual rights to create policies and social norms that protect both. And,
when the common good and liberty come into conflict, liberal
communitarians must rule which should take precedence.
Liberal communitarians emphasize that deliberations that require a
community to determine which principle—whether the common good or
individual rights—should take precedence over the other must respond to
the specific historic conditions of the time. There is no one “good” balance
between rights and the common good. For example, security measures not
considered legitimate before the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
American homeland were quickly adopted afterwards. When no new
attacks occurred over the following decades, these measures were scaled
back. In short, liberal communitarianism allows for flexibility in
determinations of the standing of the common good and individual rights;
deliberations regarding which of these values should take precedence in
any given situation must take historical context into account.

II. S UMMARY OF E XISTING L AWS
Laws prohibiting threats against government officials and lay people
exist at both the state and federal level. At the state level, legislation
9. See, e.g., Interview: In Conversation with Doi Kanae, “How Japan Can Achieve ‘Unity in
Diversity’”, INT’L HOUSE OF JAPAN, (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.i-house.or.jp/eng/programs/ihjworld17/.
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prohibiting threats varies greatly among states, with some criminalizing
threats broadly and others largely ignoring the issue. Currently, nineteen
states have laws criminalizing “terrorizing or making terroristic threats,”
defined generally “as threatening to kill another with the intent of putting
that person in fear of imminent death and under circumstances that would
reasonably cause the victim to believe that the threat will be carried out.”10
The federal government, restricted by jurisdictional concerns and the
Tenth Amendment—which ensures that, in most contexts, threats to kill
would be adjudicated in state courts under state laws—only criminalizes
some specific kinds of threats.11 The federal government has criminalized
threats made through interstate commerce and through the United States
Postal Service.12 The federal government has also criminalized threats,
made in or out of interstate commerce or the mail, against the President,
the Vice President, a major candidate for either of these offices,13 or the
immediate family of each of these individuals.14 Outside of these specific
categories, the federal government has not passed legislation criminalizing
threats.

III. T RUE THREATS IN THE C OURTS
This article turns next to a review of key cases that highlight the
varying ways courts have made it ever more difficult to deter people from
threatening each other and public officials. Under review are not only
federal cases but also cases by lower courts. To reiterate, key cases were
chosen to support the thesis of the article that it is increasingly difficult to
charge people who threaten to kill, but the article does not review all
relevant cases.

10. Unlawful Communications, JRANK, https://law.jrank.org/pages/11015/UnlawfulCommunications.html (last visited April 1, 2021).
11. The Tenth Amendment reads, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
U.S. CONST. amend. X. Since criminalizing threats to kill is not specifically delegated to the federal
government, it is no surprise that Congress has never passed comprehensive “true threats” legislation,
as a jurisdictional challenge would be inevitable. However, one could also explain the absence of more
comprehensive legislation by a mere disinterest in criminalizing “true threats” or a lack of urgency or
need to do so.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 876.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 871.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 879.
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A. The Supreme Court Burdens the Government
On August 27, 1966, Robert Watts attended an anti-war public rally
near the Washington Monument.15 During the rally, the crowd broke into
groups to discuss specific issues. In the discussion group in which Watts
participated, which was assigned the topic of police brutality, someone
commented that the younger people present should get more education
before sharing their views. Watts, only eighteen years old at the time,
responded:
They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already
received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my
physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry
a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.16

An undercover member of the Army Counter Intelligence Corps reported
Watts’s comments, which subsequently led to his arrest.
Watts was arrested for “violating a 1917 statute which prohibits any
person from ‘knowingly and willfully … [making] any threat to take the
life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States
. . . .’”17 At the trial and again on appeal, Watts made two arguments. First,
he argued that the statute was unconstitutional on its face—namely, that
someone who makes threats against the President’s life should be
protected by the First Amendment. Second, Watts maintained that his
specific statement did not constitute a true threat. Watts argued “that the
words he used could not be interpreted as a threat because they did not
contain a statement of present intention to injure the President.”18 This was
the root of his argument: a true threat is a statement that suggests an
immediacy of action, as indicated by the word “present,” and a willingness
of action, as indicated by the word “intention.”
Watts went on to describe four ways in which his statement
demonstrated a lack of “present intention.” First, he argued that his
statement was an example of “common hyperbole,” and was simply a
rhetorical device he was using to make a point.19 This, he argued, showed
a lack of intention to carry out the threat. Second, he maintained that his
statement was clearly “conditional” in nature, “that it was expressly made
conditional upon an event—induction into the Armed Forces—which
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
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Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
Id. at 706.
Id. at 705.
Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Id.
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petitioner vowed would never occur.”20 The conditional nature of his
statement, he held, went toward the lack of immediacy of his statement.
Third, he argued that his statement was merely an expression of a desire,
not an actual threat, which went towards his lack of intention.21 And
fourth, he argued that the context of how his statement was received by
those present, namely, that they laughed in response to his statement,
demonstrated a lack of intention.22 At trial, a jury found Watts’s comment
at the discussion group to be in violation of the statute, a ruling that the
D.C. Circuit Appellate Court later affirmed. He appealed, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.23
The Court answered two main questions in Watts v. United States.
First, the Court considered whether laws criminalizing threats against the
president’s life were constitutional. In a per curiam decision—a decision
in which the Court acts collectively, in contrast to standard opinions, in
which an individual Justice is responsible for authoring the decision—the
Court wrote:
Certainly the statute under which the petitioner was convicted was
constitutional on its face. The Nation undoubtedly has a valid, even an
overwhelming, interest in protecting the safety of its Chief Executive and
in allowing him to perform his duties without interference from threats
of physical violence.24

In other words, threats against the President’s life do not constitute
protected speech under the First Amendment.
Second, the Court addressed whether Watts’s specific comment
constituted a threat, and whether it fell outside of protected speech. The
Court agreed with the second half of Watts’s argument, holding that
context largely determines whether or not a threat is “true”25 and “what is
a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected
speech.”26 According to this decision, the burden falls on “the Government
to prove a true ‘threat,’” and it is up to the courts to interpret where the
dividing line between a true and an untrue threat falls.27

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 706.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 708.
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In this specific case, the Court drew that dividing line, finding that
Watts’s statement was a form of political hyperbole. Indeed, the Court
agreed with Watts’s argument that his statement was “‘a kind of very crude
offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President.’”28 The
Court wrote, “taken in context, and regarding the expressly conditional
nature of the statement and the reaction of the listeners, we do not see how
it could be interpreted otherwise.”29
B. More Burdens
On August 22, 1998, Barry Black, a resident of Carroll County,
Virginia, led a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) rally.30 The rally took place on private
property approximately 300 to 350 yards away from the public road, and
occurred with the permission of the property owner, who was also in
attendance.31 The crowd attending the rally circled around a twenty-fiveto-thirty-foot-tall cross, which was visible from the public road.32 Having
been made aware of the rally’s occurrence, a police officer drove to its
location and parked on the public road to observe the situation and report
any unlawful activity.33 Then, according to the police officer’s testimony,
“‘all of a sudden . . . [the cross] went up in . . . flame[s].’”34 The police
officer then approached the rally and asked those in attendance who was
responsible for the cross-burning.35 As the leader of the rally, Black
claimed responsibility, and the police officer subsequently arrested him
for violating a Virginia statute that criminalizes cross burning.36
Specifically, the Virginia cross-burning statute reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of
intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be
burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public
place. Any person who shall violate any provision of this section shall
be guilty of a Class 6 felony.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
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Id.
Id.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 348 (2003).
Id. at 348−49.
Id. at 349.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent
to intimidate a person or group of persons.37

At trial, and in his appeal, Black argued that the Virginia cross-burning
statute was unconstitutional. First, he argued that criminalizing crossburning restricts free speech, and therefore the statute was unconstitutional
on its face. Second, he claimed that, even if the court determined that it
was constitutional to criminalize cross-burning in some contexts, the
prima facie clause of the statute in question criminalized all crossburnings, which fails to take context into account and hence is
unconstitutional.
At trial, Black was convicted of violating the statute. On appeal, the
Virginia Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional on its face
because it “discriminates on the basis of content since it ‘selectively
chooses only cross burning because of its distinctive message.’”38 The
court also found the “prima facie evidence provision renders the statute
overbroad because ‘the enhanced probability of prosecution under the
statute chills the expression of protected speech.’”39 The Commonwealth
of Virginia appealed the decision, and the Court granted certiorari.
In the Court’s opinion in Virginia v. Black, delivered by Justice
O’Connor, the Court began by defining true threats under the existing
precedent. The Court wrote:
“True threats” encompass those statements where the speaker means
to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. The
speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a
prohibition on true threats “protect[s] individuals from the fear of
violence” and “from the disruption that fear engenders,” in addition to
protecting people “from the possibility that the threatened violence will
occur.”40

The Court identified two constitutional questions raised by Virginia v.
Black. First, whether the intent to intimidate through speech, symbolic or
otherwise, was protected under the First Amendment. And second,
whether a speech act could be considered prima facie evidence of
intimidation.
With regard to the first question, the Court found that, indeed, speech
intended to intimidate is a type of true threat, and it can be criminalized
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 348 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1983)).
Id. at 351.
Id.
Id. at 359−60 (citation omitted).
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within the bounds of the Constitution, overturning the Virginia Supreme
Court ruling. Justice O’Connor wrote, “Intimidation in the constitutionally
proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker
directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing
the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”41
However, with regard to the second question, concerning whether a
speech act could be considered prima facie evidence of intimidation, the
Court affirmed the Virginia Supreme Court ruling. It concluded that the
burning of a cross is not always a symbol of intimidation, and, while it can
be used for intimidation, the prima facie clause of the statute in question
does not allow room for a situation in which cross-burning occurs for
reasons not associated with intimidation. Justice O’Connor wrote:
The prima facie provision makes no effort to distinguish among these
different types of cross burnings. It does not distinguish between a cross
burning done with the purpose of creating anger or resentment and a
cross burning done with the purpose of threatening or intimidating a
victim. It does not distinguish between a cross burning at a public rally
or a cross burning on a neighbor’s lawn. It does not treat the cross
burning directed at an individual differently from the cross burning
directed at a group of like-minded believers.42

In other words, cross-burning, like most speech acts, allows for the
communication of many different things from the same act. One must
consider the context in which a speech act is being made—as, for example,
the Court considered the context, the nature of the statement, and its effect
on the listeners in Watts—in order to determine its intent. Similar
considerations are necessary in the context of cross-burning. In this way,
the Court further limited the conditions under which threats are true: intent
must also be taken into account.
It is important to note that the Court did not consider whether crossburning could be a form of intimidation. Rather, it stated that “the history
of cross burning in this country shows that cross burning is often
intimidating, intended to create a pervasive fear in victims that they are a
target of violence.”43 Furthermore, Black did not bring forth the argument
that cross-burning cannot be used for the purpose of intimidation. As
Justice O’Connor reported, “[r]espondents do not contest that some cross
burnings fit within this meaning of intimidating speech, and rightly so.”44
41.
42.
43.
44.
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Id. at 360.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 360.
Id.
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Thus, in this case, the Court did not consider whether cross-burning could
be a form of intimidation through symbolic speech; rather, it considered
whether intimidation, through symbolic speech or otherwise, is a
constitutionally legitimate component of a true threat.
C. Still More Complexities
Anthony Douglas Elonis, an amateur and self-produced music artist,
began posting rap videos and lyrics on Facebook after his wife left him.45
His lyrics contained “graphically violent language and imagery
concerning his wife, co-workers, a kindergarten class, and state and federal
law enforcement.”46 In one of these posts, Elonis wrote the following:
Hi, I’m Tone Elonis.
Did you know that it’s illegal for me to say I want to kill my wife? . . .
It’s one of the only sentences that I’m not allowed to say . . . .
Now it was okay for me to say it right then because I was just telling you
that it’s illegal for me to say I want to kill my wife . . . .
....
I also found out that it’s incredibly illegal, extremely illegal to go on
Facebook and say something like the best place to fire a mortar launcher
at her house would be from the cornfield behind it because of easy access
to a getaway road and you’d have a clear line of sight through the sun
room … Yet even more illegal to show an illustrated diagram. [diagram
of the house]47

Elonis frequently claimed, in posts on Facebook and in testimony
following his arrest, that he did not intend to threaten anyone through his
lyrics; rather, he was using Facebook as a platform to publish his art, and
he asserted that writing rap lyrics was “therapeutic.”48 As Chief Justice
Roberts stated in the Court’s opinion, “Elonis’s co-workers and friends
viewed the posts in a different light.”49
Elonis was arrested and charged with five counts of violating 18
U.S.C. § 875(c), a federal statute that criminalizes threats made through
interstate commerce. Specifically, the statute reads, “Whoever transmits
in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015).
Id.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 727.
Id.
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threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.”50
Elonis argued that the word “threat” implies that the person making
the statement knows that the statement is a threat.51 As such, at his jury
trial, Elonis requested the following jury instruction: “the government
must prove that he [Elonis] intended to communicate a true threat.”52 This
request was denied by the District Court. Instead, the jury instruction read
as follows:
A statement is a true threat when a defendant intentionally makes a
statement in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable
person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to
whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of
an intention to inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual.53

In other words, Elonis requested that the court recognize a higher burden
of proof for prosecution under this federal statute. He argued that the
government should be required to prove that the communicator of the
threat intended to communicate the threat. Elonis claimed that the
communicator’s state of mind is an essential component for determining
guilt and cannot be overlooked.54 The government argued that this higher
burden of proof was unnecessary for a conviction and that a “reasonable
person” or negligence standard was sufficient.55 Ultimately, the court
denied Elonis’s request and maintained the lower, “reasonable person”
standard.56 In applying this standard, the government need not prove that
Elonis intended to communicate a threat; rather, they need only prove that
a “reasonable person” would consider his words threatening. Elonis
appealed the verdict, but the Appellate Court upheld the decision of the
lower court.57 Elonis appealed the verdict again, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.58
The question the Court considered in Elonis v. United States was
“whether the statute [18 U.S.C. § 875(c)] also requires that the defendant

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
Elonis, 575 U.S. at 732.
Id. at 731.
Id.
Id. at 732.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 723.
Id. at 732.
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be aware of the threatening nature of the communication, and—if not—
whether the First Amendment requires such a showing.”59
The Court decided that the defendant must be aware of the threatening
nature of his communication in order for him to be convicted of a felony
under this statute.60 The Court emphasized the history and precedent
behind the two different burden of proof standards—the reasonable person
standard and the intent or state of mind standard—in order to explain its
ruling. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, highlighted the
categorically different applications of these standards. The reasonable
person standard is a common burden of proof in tort law, which determines
civil liability. It is rarely ever applied to criminal law. He then went on to
describe what is considered a “basic principle” of criminal law: that
“wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.”61 While an individual
need not know at the time of his crime that his actions are criminal—the
well-known maxim ignorantia juris non excusat (ignorance of the law
excuses not) still holds—once the law has been explained to him, he must
“know the facts that make his conduct fit the definition of the offense.”62
Since “[f]ederal criminal liability generally does not turn solely on the
results of an act without considering the defendant’s mental state,”
Elonis’s conviction, based on jury instructions that did not require jurors
to consider his intention, was invalid.63
The conditional way in which Chief Justice Roberts framed the
question of the case allowed the Court to bypass any consideration of the
First Amendment implications of this case. His justification for not ruling
on First Amendment questions, and thereby building on the Supreme
Court’s still flimsy definition of true threats, was purely prudential. He
argued that the Court historically only responds to questions raised by the
petitioner himself, not to questions the Justices find relevant.64 Since
Elonis built his case on the specifics of the jury instructions and the proper
application of the reasonable person standard, it was to this question that
the Court needed to respond. However, one could easily argue that the
Court constructed their opinion specifically to avoid such First
Amendment issues, which tend to be more challenging and controversial.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 726.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 734 (citation omitted).
Id. at 735 (citation omitted).
Id. at 740.
Id. at 740−42.
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Rather than use the opportunity of Elonis to clarify the definition of true
threats for the lower courts, the Court decided to avoid such consideration.
D. And Still More
Most recently, the Court had an opportunity to clarify its definition of
true threats in Perez v. Florida.65 Robert Perez was drinking a mixture of
vodka and grapefruit juice, a concoction he called a “molly cocktail,” with
his friends on the beach. At one point, the group ran out of ingredients for
the “molly cocktail” and went to a nearby liquor store to restock their
supply.66 At the liquor store, an employee, overhearing Perez and his
friends, thought Perez was referring to an incendiary “Molotov cocktail”
and asked if it would “burn anything up.”67 Perez responded to the store
employee, saying that he did not have “that type” of cocktail, and the group
laughed at his response. He then went on to say, in an action Justice
Sotomayor calls “imprudent,” that he had only “one Molotov cocktail” and
could “blow the whole place up.”68
According to Florida Statute §790.162 (2007), it is a felony “to
threaten to throw, project, place, or discharge any destructive device with
intent to do bodily harm to any person or with intent to do damage to any
property of any person.”69 Robert Perez was arrested and found in
violation of this statute based on his comments at the liquor store.70
Similar to the appeal in Elonis, Perez’s appeal to the appellate court
and later to the Supreme Court argued that, at his trial, the district court
offered the jury instructions that, in effect, lowered the burden of proof to
a reasonable person standard instead of a burden of proof where the jury
must consider the mental state of the defendant. The Supreme Court
declined to grant certiorari.
In a concurrence to the denial of certiorari, Justice Sotomayor
emphasized the still ambiguous definition of true threats and its lack of
concrete and comprehensive precedent. Sotomayor ultimately agreed,
albeit “reluctantly,” that Perez v. Florida was not the proper case to create
such precedent.71 Again, similarly to the decision in Elonis, the lower
courts decided the case on the basis of a jury instruction question, not a
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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First Amendment question, and thus it would be improper to answer a First
Amendment question through this specific case. But Justice Sotomayor
went on to write that “the Court should also decide precisely what level of
intent suffices under the First Amendment—a question we avoided two
Terms ago in Elonis.”72
Currently, as the law stands, there is a hole in the Court’s
constitutional interpretation of the First Amendment. Other “narrowly
limited classes of speech”73 have comprehensive definitions, allowing for
clarity and consistency in the law’s application in lower courts. However,
true threats, as a category of speech that the government can
constitutionally regulate, is as uncertain as it is unclear.
E. Lower Courts Are Struggling
The absence of a clear definition of true threats is reflected in the
difficulties lower courts have exhibited in their dealings with people who
threatened others. As legal scholars Kevin Francis O’Neill and David L.
Hudson Jr. argued, federal circuit courts “left to their own devices[,] . . .
created several approaches to their treatment of true threats cases.”74 For
example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals both tried threats cases, but, having no clear superior court
precedent to look to for guidance, both courts created their own definitions
of true threats, which happen to be different.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided a case in 1976, United
States v. Kelner, concerning true threats.75 Russell Kelner, the appellant in
this case, was a member of the Jewish Defense League (JDL) in New York
City. On November 11, 1974, the JDL notified United Press International
(UPI) that they were having a press conference at the JDL headquarters
later that day to address a speech Yasser Arafat—the leader of the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—was scheduled to make in front
of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City.76 In an
interview at this press conference, the following exchange took place
between John Miller, a reporter for WPIX-TV (Channel 11) and Kelner:

72. Id. at 855.
73. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
74. Kevin Francis O’Neill, True Threats, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA (Updated
June 2017 by David L. Hudson Jr.), https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1025/true-threats.
75. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d. Cir 1976).
76. Id. at 1020–21.
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Kelner: We have people who have been trained and who are out now and
who intend to make sure that Arafat and his lieutenants do not leave this
country alive.
Miller: How do you plan to do that? You’re going to kill him?
Kelner: I’m talking about justice. I’m talking about equal rights under
the law, a law that may not exist, but should exist.
Miller: Are you saying that you plan to kill them?
Kelner: We are planning to assassinate Mr. Arafat. [sic.] just the way any
other murderer is treated.
Miller: Do you have the people picked out for this? Have you planned it
out? Have you started this operation?
Kelner: Everything is planned in detail.77

The editorial board at WPIX-TV decided to air the audio-video footage on
the ten o’clock news. At trial, Kelner was convicted of “causing to be
transmitted in interstate commerce a communication containing a ‘threat
to injure the person of another’” under statute 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 875(c).78
Kelner was sentenced to a year in prison and given a $1,000 fine. The
appeals court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Kelner appealed to
the Second Circuit Court.
In his appeal, Kelner argued that his communication (specifically what
he had said in the interview) should be protected under the First
Amendment as “political hyperbole,” in accordance with Watts.79 The
decision of the Second Circuit, written by Judge Oakes, systematically
reviewed the claims Kelner presented to the court. Judge Oakes wrote that
it is important that the courts maintain “a narrow construction of the word
‘threat’ in the statute here, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), as . . . is consonant with the
protection of First Amendment interests.”80 However, he went on to write
that, even with a narrow definition of the word “threat,” a “threat itself
may affront such important social interests that it is punishable absent
proof of a specific intent to carry it into action when the following criteria
are satisfied.”81 He wrote: “So long as the threat on its face and in the
circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional,
immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity

77.
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of purpose and imminent prospect of execution, the statute may properly
be applied.”82
In this decision, Judge Oakes offers four criteria for what constitutes
a true threat. First, the threat must be obviously a threat, in and out of
context. Second, the threat must be directed at a specific person. Third, the
threat must convey a willingness to execute the threat. And fourth, the
threat must convey an urgency or immediacy of execution. If all four of
these criteria for a threat are met—which the court determined was the
case in Kelner’s interview transcript—then that threat is “true” and cannot
be protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech.
The Ninth Circuit decided a case concerning true threats, United States
v. Cassel, in 2005.83 In 1998, Paul Kent Cassel was living on the property
of Anastasia Kafteranis, his girlfriend, located near Randsburg, California.
The federal government owned the lots surrounding Kafteranis’s property,
and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) sought to sell them. “Cassel
apparently liked his privacy” and was not keen on having new neighbors.84
On two different occasions, when people came to view the lot adjoining
the Kafteranis property, Cassel approached the prospective buyers with his
aggressive dogs and tried to convince them that the lot was undesirable.
Cassel claimed, among other things, . . . that the surrounding area was
inhabited by child molesters, murderers, producers of illegal drugs,
devil-worshipers, and witches; that the ground was a toxic waste dump
contaminated with cyanide; that local law enforcement officials were
corrupt; that mining explosions had damaged Kafteranis’s own house;
and that a neighbor had developed a disease known as “silica lung.”85

One prospective buyer testified in court that Cassel told him, “that if I
[Goodin] tried to build anything on Lot 107, that it would definitely burn.
He would see to that. That if I left anything there, it would be stolen,
vandalized. He would see to that.”86 None of the prospective buyers Cassel
approached ended up buying the property, and eventually Kafteranis
purchased the lot at auction.
In November 2000, Cassel was charged in the Eastern District of
California with two counts of interfering with a federal land sale under 18
U.S.C. § 1860. The statute “punishes, in relevant part, ‘[w]hoever, by
intimidation . . . hinders, prevents, or attempts to hinder or prevent, any
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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person from bidding upon or purchasing any tract of’ federal land at public
sale.”87 Cassel was convicted of violating this statute by a jury in 2001,
and he was sentenced to five months’ imprisonment and 150 days of home
confinement. Cassel appealed to the district court, which affirmed his
conviction and sentence. Cassel appealed again to the appellate court.
The disputed question in this case is similar to the First Amendment
question in Elonis, namely whether there was an intent to communicate a
threat. In the circuit court opinion for United States v. Cassel, Judge
O’Scannlain wrote that “the disputed question is whether the government
must prove that the defendant intended his words or conduct to be
understood by the victim as a threat.”88 Cassel argued that even though he
intended to say the words he said to the prospective buyers, he did not
mean for those words to be interpreted by the prospective buyers as a
threat. Because the government did not prove that Cassel intended to
threaten the prospective buyers, Cassel argued that his speech is protected
under the First Amendment. The government argued that “speech is
punishable if a reasonable person would understand it as a threat, whether
or not the speaker meant for it to be so understood.”89 In other words,
Cassel argued that an intent standard was necessary to restrict speech
otherwise protected by the First Amendment, and the government argued
that a lower burden of proof, a mere negligence or reasonable person
standard, was sufficient for speech to be constitutionally restricted.
Drawing on the Virginia v. Black decision, Judge O’Scannlain argued
that the Supreme Court’s definition of true threats, as outlined in
O’Connor’s opinion in Black, clearly asserts the importance of an intent
requirement for true threats. Judge O’Scannlain wrote, “the clear import
of this definition is that only intentional threats are criminally punishable
consistently with the First Amendment.”90 He went on to write that “[w]e
are therefore bound to conclude that speech may be deemed unprotected
by the First Amendment as a ‘true threat’ only upon proof that the speaker
subjectively intended the speech as a threat.”91
Returning to Cassel’s specific case, the Ninth Circuit vacated the
district court’s judgement and remanded the case for re-trial. Because the
government failed to demonstrate adequate mens rea, along with other
inconsistencies such as improper jury instructions, Cassel’s case,
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
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according to the opinion of the court, warranted a re-trial according to their
newly clarified definition of a true threat.
Kelner and Cassel, taken together, demonstrate that “[u]ntil the
Supreme Court formulates a definitive test for true threats, lawyers must
invoke the test that prevails in their jurisdictions.”92

IV. F IGHTING W ORDS F URTHER WEAKEN THE S TATE
A different approach to limiting threatening speech without unduly
curbing the First Amendment is to return to, and strengthen, “fighting
words” as a category of unprotected speech. The Supreme Court has
deemed it constitutionally permissible to criminalize fighting words. The
Court first established the fighting words doctrine in the case Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire.93 Walter Chaplinsky, a practicing Jehovah’s Witness,
was distributing literature in support of his beliefs on a public sidewalk in
downtown Rochester, New Hampshire, when a town marshal approached
him. Chaplinsky called to the marshal, saying, “You are a God damned
racketeer” and “a damned Fascist.”94 Chaplinsky was subsequently
arrested for, and convicted of, violating a state law that prohibited:
“any offensive, derisive or annoying word” addressed to any person in a
public place under the state court’s interpretation of the statute as being
limited to ”fighting words”—i.e., to words that “have a direct tendency
to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark
is addressed.”95

On appeal, Chaplinsky argued that the above law violated his First
Amendment right to free speech on the grounds that it is overly vague.
In response, the Court reiterated that “the right of free speech is not
absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”96 In 1942, when the
opinion of the Court was written, the specific “well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem” included “the
lewd and obscene, the profane, [and] the libelous.”97 The court defined
fighting words “narrowly” and “well” by stating that these words are
92.
93.
94.
95.
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“those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.”98 The Court then provided a test to
determine whether or not a speech act falls into the category of fighting
words and determined that a “reasonable person” standard is sufficient in
determining whether or not a statement constitutes fighting words.
While the Supreme Court has not overturned Chaplinsky, in the nearly
eighty years since the ruling, the Court has taken significant steps to
minimize the scope of Chaplinsky’s precedent by carefully examining
statutes criminalizing fighting words. The Court has closely scrutinized
statutes for vagueness and on overbreadth grounds and has overturned
convictions for not adequately falling within their increasingly narrow
definition of fighting words.
The Court began to minimize the scope of fighting words just seven
years after the Chaplinsky decision. In the case Terminiello v. Chicago,
the Court overturned the conviction of Father Arthur Terminiello, who was
arrested and initially convicted of causing a “breach of the peace” by way
of his “vigorously, if not viciously, critic[al]” speech in front of a
protesting crowd.99 Not only did the Court overturn his conviction, but it
found the ordinance criminalizing speech that caused a “breach in the
peace” unconstitutional. Reading the Chaplinsky decision at its face, such
an ordinance should easily fall into the category of fighting words defined
as “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.”100 But, in the Terminiello decision, the
Court narrowed the scope of fighting words to speech that would be “likely
to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises
far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”101 Defending this
shift from a “breach of the peace” standard to a “clear and present danger
standard” for fighting words, Justice Douglas, in the opinion of the Court,
wrote that “a function of free speech under our system of government is to
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger.”102
The Terminiello decision was the first in a series of Supreme Court
decisions in which the Court either overturned convictions based on
“breach of peace” ordinances and statutes or reiterated the need for the
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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higher “clear and present danger” standard to constitutionally prohibit
certain types of speech. For example, in 1951, in the case Feiner v. New
York, the Court did not overturn the conviction, but emphasized the
importance of a “clear and present danger” standard for criminalizing
fighting words.103 In 1963, in the case Edwards v. South Carolina, the
Court overturned the convictions of 187 students convicted under a
“breach of the peace” statute.104 In 1969, in the case Street v. New York,
the Court again overturned a conviction under “fighting words”
legislation.105 In the opinion, the Court emphasized how narrow the
category of fighting words had become when it wrote: “we cannot say that
the appellant’s remarks were so inherently inflammatory as to come within
that small class of ‘fighting words.’”106
This trend of the courts, both lower and upper, refusing to apply the
Chaplinsky precedent to affirm a fighting words conviction is well
exemplified by the 1971 case Cohen v. California.107 Justice Harlan, in the
opinion of the Court, acknowledged the precedent Chaplinsky provides
when he wrote:
“[T]he States are free to ban the simple use, without a demonstration
of additional justifying circumstances, of so-called ‘fighting words,’ those
personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen,
are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke
violent reaction.”108 But instead of using this precedent to affirm a
conviction, the Court went on to apply a higher level of scrutiny—clear
and present danger—than that called for by the Chaplinsky breach of peace
precedent.109
Cohen v. California represents just one example of a visible pattern of
the Court neglecting and essentially ignoring the Chaplinsky precedent.
Therefore, while Chaplinsky remains formally alive, it is of little
significance as constitutional precedent.110
All this shows that the fighting words doctrine is a very weak reed to
rely on if one seeks to limit threats to kill.

103. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951).
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V. W ITHIN H ISTORY
This section contains a few select examples of the many thousands of
threats that are made each year in the U.S. A significant number of these
threats are made against public officials, but many are also made against
fellow citizens and family members. These threats terrorize people, force
them to take protective measures, and make them increasingly reluctant to
run for public office; when people do in fact take office, these threats tend
to hold them back, lest they and their family be injured.
This phenomenon is exemplified by the telling case of the pain
inflicted on Lenny Pozner, the father of six-year-old Sandy Hook shooting
victim Noah Pozner. He received death threats from people claiming that
the mass shooting on December 14, 2012 at Sandy Hook Elementary
School in Newtown, Connecticut was a hoax. Noah was “A sweet-faced,
big-eyed, brown-haired boy,” yet “his tiny body took multiple bullets.”111
Just days after the shooting, conspiracy theories spread over the internet,
claiming that Sandy Hook never happened, that it was staged by actors, or
that the children had never existed and it was “a ruse by President
Obama/the anti-gun movement/the ‘New World Order global elitists.’”112
Some people found these conspiracy theories so convincing that they
began harassing and threatening the parents of the victims. For example,
Lucy Richards, one such conspiracy theory believer, left Lenny Pozner
threatening emails and voicemails such as: “you gonna die, death is
coming to you real soon” and, “LOOK BEHIND YOU IT IS DEATH.”113
Threats to grieving parents may shock the conscience, but they are far
from the only chilling examples of threatening speech in the U.S.
Politicians also receive death threats. President Biden received death
threats shortly after he arrived at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. David Kyle
Reeves called the White House switchboard and left a message that he
“was going to kill everyone and ‘chop [their] heads off.’”114 In subsequent
calls, he made threats directed at the President and at the Secret Service
111. Hadley Freeman, Sandy Hook Father Leonard Pozner on Death Threats: ‘I’d Never
Imagined I’d Have to Fight for my Child’s Legacy’, THE GUARDIAN (May 2, 2017, 11:05 AM ET),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/may/02/sandy-hook-school-hoax-massacreconspiracists-victim-father.
112. Id.
113. Daniella Silva, Sandy Hook Conspiracy Theorist Gets Prison Time for Death Threats
Against Parents, NBC NEWS (June 7, 2017, 5:27 PM ET), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/sandy-hook-conspiracy-theorist-gets-jail-time-death-threats-against-n769276.
114. Tina Burnside & Hollie Silverman, North Carolina Man Charged with Threatening to Kill
President Biden, CNN (Feb. 11, 2021, 6:54 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/11/us/mancharged-with-threatening-to-kill-president/index.html.
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agent at the other end of the line.115 Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer
and Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel received “credible [death]
threats” sent by Robert Sinclair Tesh through a social media messenger on
April 14, 2020.116
Brad Raffensperger, Georgia’s Republican secretary of state, received
a number of death threats in November and December of 2020. Following
criticism and false allegations by President Trump against Georgia’s vote
counting, Raffensperger began receiving the following messages: “You
better not botch this recount, [y]our life depends on it” and “The
Raffenspergers should be put on trial for treason and face execution.”117
Furthermore, Raffensperger’s wife received a text that read, “Your
husband deserves to face a firing squad.”118
Judge James Louis Robart, a sitting senior judge of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington, began receiving
death threats in late 2017. In December of that year, Judge Robart partially
lifted the Trump administration’s ban on refugees from eleven Muslimmajority countries. Former President Trump responded on Twitter,
expressing his discontent with Robart’s ruling and referring to him as a
“so-called judge.”119 This subsequently led to Judge Robart receiving
40,000 threatening messages, 1,100 of which “were serious enough to be
investigated.”120 The judge received so many direct death threats that “the
U.S. marshals set up camp around [his] house.” Of the messages he
received, 100 were direct death threats.121
In November of 2020, Brian Maiorana, a fifty-four-year-old Staten
Island resident, posted the following to social media: “As the Jew Senator
from Jew York said nothing is off the table . . . We blow up the FBI
115. Id.
116. Craig Mauger, Detroit Man Arrested After Allegedly Threatening to Kill Whitmer, Nessel,
THE DETROIT NEWS (May 15, 2020, 12:56 PM ET),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2020/05/15/detroit-man-arrested-afterallegedly-threatening-whitmer-nessel/5199169002/.
117. Jake Lahut, Georgia Republican Secretary of State and His Wife Received Texts Telling
Them They Deserve ‘to Face a Firing Squad’ as Trump Escalated His Attacks on Election Results,
INSIDER (Nov. 19, 2020, 11:23AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/georgia-secretary-of-state-andhis-wife-receive-death-threats-2020-11.
118. Id.
119. Bill Whitaker, Federal Judges Call for Increased Security After Threats Jump 400% and
One Judge’s Son is Killed, 60 MINUTES (Feb. 21, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/federaljudge-threats-attack-60-minutes-2021-02-21/.
120. Id.
121. Id.; Judges Raise Alarm as Personal Threats Intensify, Amplified by Social Media, A.B.A.
(Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2019/08/judgesraise-alarm-as-personal-threats-intensify—amplified-by-s/.
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building for real. All the alphabet agencies assassination will become the
new normal.”122
After she spoke out against the baseless claims that the 2020 election
was stolen, Michigan state Representative Cynthia Johnson used social
media to share some of the many death threats she received. One voicemail
left on her phone contained the following message: “Honey, how dare you
bully witnesses on the stand. Your name and phone number are out there
now.” The voicemail continued: “You should be swinging from a f***ing
rope you Democrat.”123 And another caller left this message: “I hope you
like burning crosses in your front yard, because I’m sure by the time this
is all said and done, there will be several, and maybe even a noose or two
hanging from the tree in your yard.”124
Amber McReynolds, the head of the National Vote at Home Institute,
a nonprofit organization that promotes voting by mail, has experienced an
increasing number of online threats since the 2020 election. Describing
one such threat, McReynolds says, “He sent me a picture of a noose and
said, ‘You’re a traitor to the American people.’”125
Data suggest that threats are increasing nationally. Rachel Kleinfeld,
a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said
in an interview for NPR in 2020:
We are facing a pretty unusual uptick in violence and threats and
intimidation against public officials across the range, from the really
hyper-local people who are either running for their state assemblies or
public health officials, who are working on basic public health in the
COVID pandemic, all the way to AOC [Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez] and
members of Congress and so on.126

Some statistics do exist to support this statement: “In 2018 and again in
2019, for example, Capitol Hill law enforcement reported that threats
122. Jonathan Stempel, NYC Man Charged with Making Death Threats Against Democratic
Protesters, Politicians, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2020, 7:22 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-newyork-arrest-threats/nyc-man-charged-with-making-death-threats-against-democratic-protesterspoliticians-idUSKBN27R00V.
123. Max White, State Rep. Cynthia A. Johnson from Detroit Posts Racist Voicemail Saying
She Should Be Lynched, WXYZ DETROIT (Dec. 7, 2020, 4:35 AM),
https://www.wxyz.com/news/state-rep-cynthia-a-johnson-from-detroit-posts-racist-voicemailsaying-she-should-be-lynched.
124. Danielle Kurtzleben, From Congress to Local Health Boards Public Officials Suffer
Threats and Harassment, NPR (Dec. 16 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/12/16/946818045/from-congress-to-local-health-boards-public-officialssuffer-threats-and-harassm.
125. Id.; Michael Wines, Here are the Threats Terrorizing Election Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/03/us/election-officials-threats-trump.html.
126. Id.
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against members of Congress were increasing.”127 And, since 2015,
“threats of federal judges have jumped 400% to more than 4,000 last year
[2020].”128
A district attorney in a major city made the following comment about
the preceding analysis:
[C]aselaw is not giving the full picture of how many people may be in
jail or awaiting trial or otherwise punished for threats… searches for
“threats” may not reveal all the restraining orders, barring orders from
public buildings, officers watching homes, threat givers getting picked
up on other charges, outreach for mental/behavioral health help, in
addition to actual threat cases that plea out without opinions, sometimes
on lesser charges like “attempted threats” or something like that.129

A survey released by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) “revealed
that a significant number of Americans appear comfortable with the idea
of using violence to address political failures, and across the political aisle,
there is widespread agreement that the current democratic system is not
working for ordinary people,” according to the report analyzing this
survey’s findings.130 AEI’s survey contained several troubling points of
data which support this claim. First, “[m]ore than one in three (36 percent)
Americans agree with the statement: ‘The traditional American way of life
is disappearing so fast that we may have to use force to save it.’”131
Second, the “majority (56 percent) of Republicans support the use of force
as a way to arrest the decline of the traditional American way of life.”132
Smaller, but still nonzero percentages of “Independents (35 percent) and
Democrats (22 percent) say the use of force is necessary to stop the
disappearance of traditional American values and way of life.”133 Third,
“[n]early three in 10 (29 percent) Americans completely or somewhat
agree with the statement: ‘If elected leaders will not protect America, the
people must do it themselves even if it requires taking violent actions.’”134
127. Id.
128. Bill Whitaker, Federal Judges Call for Increased Security After Threats Jump 400% and
One Judge’s Son is Killed, 60 MINUTES (Feb. 21, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/federaljudge-threats-attack-60-minutes-2021-02-21/.
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In short, Americans are becoming increasingly comfortable with the idea
of turning to violence to achieve a political goal.
There are no conclusive statistics that allow one to state that the
frequency of threats to kill has recently increased. One has the impression
that they have grown since 2015 as the general culture has turned more
toxic. This article assumes, for the sake of the following argument, that
these threats are too common, that they terrorize citizens and hamper
public officials, and that they have been increasing.
The liberal communitarian thesis is, to reiterate, that the balance
between individual rights and the common good must be constantly
adjusted as historical conditions change. The assumption that violent
speech, namely threats to kill and harm, has increased significantly in the
U.S. in recent years, roughly since 2015, suggests that this issue may be
ripe for rebalancing. Public discourse, Congress, and the courts should
revisit the issue at hand and consider whether the time has come to relocate
the marker that separates constitutionally protected speech from
unprotected speech.

VI. R ECOMMENDATIONS
Currently, in the U.S., there is a strong tendency to see the two major
political parties as two opposing tribes, in the sense that members have
developed strong bonds to their tribe, identify with it, and are hostile
toward the other tribe. In 2014, Pew Research published a graphic titled
“Beyond Dislike: Viewing the Other Party as a ‘Threat to the Nation’s
Wellbeing.’”135 The graphic appears in a study called “Political
Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing Ideological
Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise and
Everyday Life.” The study describes how people on the left and on the
right have begun to hold increasingly opposing ideological views, how
liberals and conservatives have different preferences for the kinds of
communities in which they would like to live, how those who consistently
identify with one party do not want their family members to marry people
of opposing political affiliations, and how strong partisans are frequently
only close friends with people who share their views.136 Each tribe blames
135. Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 11, 2014),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/pp2014-06-12-polarization-0-02/ (last visited April 1, 2021) (full study found at
https://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2014/06/6-12-2014-Political-PolarizationRelease.pdf).
136. Id.
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the other for the heightened level of tensions, hostilities, and violence. One
side points to white supremacy and the far-right wing; the other side points
to Antifa and the far left.
One response, often coming from various voluntary associations
committed to promoting civility, is to call for national unity, to promote
efforts to overcome the ways in which these two tribes are different, and
to emphasize that there are many more shared values and bonds of affinity
than there are differences. Such a response oftentimes includes a call for a
return to a world where both sides could put aside whatever differences
they had in order to engage in not just peaceful but also civil discourse.
However, there is little evidence that political and cultural tribalism can be
overcome in the near future.
Others seek to ban a much wider span of speech than here suggested,
namely hate or racist speech, following such bans by other democracies.
The same people argue that focusing on tightening restrictions against
threats of violence is a far too narrow approach. Such advocates often
argue for the prohibition of hate speech as an essential step towards curing
American political culture, which has become highly toxic. Indeed, such
advocates often contend that violent forms of speech—such as death
threats—are merely one expression of a much more pervasively hostile
culture. However, such a ban would curb an exceptionally large amount
of speech and would inevitably face the difficult challenge of determining
which expressions are hateful and which are not.
Moreover, it is important to try to disaggregate the haters by separating
those who are willing to turn to violence and violent speech from others.
This call to separate hate speech from violent speech is not to suggest that
hate speech, and its recent rise, is not concerning or problematic. Rather,
emphasizing their separateness allows for the development of distinct
treatments for the rise of violent speech and the rise of hate speech. This
paper maintains that participants in the former should face the wrath of the
law, and participants in the latter should face extensive civic and cultural
educational initiatives. The suggestions made here, in this article, merely
entail recriminalizing violent speech based on, and building upon, existing
legislation that has been weakened by the courts. Banning hate speech
would entail new federal laws and face strong opposition from supporters
of the First Amendment on both the right and the left.
The preceding analysis suggests that laws governing the U.S.
regarding threats to kill are not adequate in the current circumstances.
From this conclusion come two prescriptive recommendations regarding
how to properly proceed and begin to remedy this situation: first, all state
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legislatures should adopt legislation criminalizing violent speech; second,
the courts, in reviewing these laws and revisiting previous cases, should
adopt a significantly lower standard of scrutiny for what is considered a
true threat.
A. Legislation
Currently, only nineteen states have legislation criminalizing threats.
Most of these state laws were enacted in 2002, as a component of different
states’ anti-terrorism legislation.137 For example, in Arkansas, “A person
commits the offense of terroristic threatening in the first degree if . . . the
person threatens to cause death or serious physical injury or substantial
property damage to another person; or” the “person threatens to cause
physical injury or property damage to a teacher or other school employee
acting in the line of duty,” for “the purpose of terrorizing another
person.”138 In Kentucky, “a person is guilty of terroristic threatening in the
third degree when . . . he threatens to commit any crime likely to result in
death or serious physical injury to another person or likely to result in
substantial property damage to another person.”139 States that already have
enacted legislation criminalizing threats should review their legal codes
and determine whether the language of the laws, originally written to
respond to the sociopolitical climate and culture following the 2001
attacks, still adequately responds to the current sociopolitical
circumstances. The remaining thirty-one states should adopt similar
legislation.
The essence of the law could be succinctly stated: thou shalt not
threaten to kill. Once this is clearly stated, extenuating as well as
exacerbating conditions, and levels of punishment, can be added. For
example, if the person never was charged before and no evidence is present
that the person has engaged in threatening behavior, the penalty might be
limited to a warning and police record. If threatening is a pattern, the
person may be required to attend anger management classes and may be
subject to one or more restraining orders. At still a higher level, the person
might be subject to home arrest, with allowances for work and religious
services. In the case of some offenders, some jail time might be called for.
The person may be added to various watchlists. Justice Sotomayor referred
137. Margot Williams & Trevor Aaronson, How Individual States Have Criminalized
Terrorism, THE INTERCEPT (March 23, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/03/23/statedomestic-terrorism-laws/.
138. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-301 (2017).
139. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.080 (West 2001).
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to a lack of clarity as to what constitutes a threat.140 One way to add such
clarity is to make it crystal-clear that to threaten to kill is a crime. The
historical conditions demand that kind of clarity because not only do
individuals have the right not to be terrorized, but such clarity is required
for American democracy to be safeguarded.
B. Judicial Review
The Court opened a Pandora’s Box when it ruled that some threats to
kill are not true threats, inviting the question of where to draw the dividing
line between the two. Systematically, over the past decades, the Court has
adopted an increasingly high standard of scrutiny for true threats
legislation. The Court, however, can now reverse course and begin to
adopt a lower standard of scrutiny for these cases. By far the most
important change that is called for concerns the matter of intent. The
Supreme Court has set a very high burden of proof, requiring the
government to meet a mens rea standard, namely that the defendant
considered his own statement a threat. This requires the prosecution to
examine the state of mind of the offender, a highly subjective matter, and
invites claims by the defense attorneys that the offender did not mean it. It
makes prosecution of threats much too difficult.
Instead, the Court should find that the government must meet only the
“reasonable person test,” that is whether such a person would consider the
communication of the defendant a threat. This is a test often used by the
courts, for instance in determining expectations of privacy.141
Next is the matter of context. Some courts have demanded that the
prosecution establish the social and cultural circumstances in which the
threat was made to show that it was made in earnest and not as a joke or
mere hyperbole. However, there are many thousands of threats, and, as
shown by the examples cited above, a rising number seem to be genuine.
Here, too, the reasonable person standard should be applied. The rest can
be left to the discretion of the prosecutor. Surely they would not charge an
actor who threatened another character in the context of a play, say,
Macbeth or Othello, with “I will kill you!”

140. See Perez v. Florida, 137 S. Ct. 853 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (cited infra note
66).
141. The Court may look to Justice Thomas’s dissent in Elonis v. US for guidance as to the
proper level of scrutiny the Court should apply to true threats cases, as he emphasizes that a mens rea
standard is far too high to ever produce a conviction and is not constitutionally required. See Elonis v.
United States, 575 U.S. 723, 750 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); discussion infra Section III.C.
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C ONCLUSION
Laws, and the public discourse that both leads to their enactment and
follows their implementation, often help to reset social norms. The
proposed changes in state laws and interpretations by the courts outlined
in this article seek to reset the social norms that govern which speech is
tolerable and which is not. Threatening to kill someone should be deemed
unlawful. The re-criminalization of such threats should be viewed as a step
towards a less toxic, and, one may hope, less violent social and political
culture in the U.S. There may well be ways to achieve this goal other than
by criminalizing violent speech—and there may be different ways to curb
this kind of speech than those here suggested. However, until these are
presented, the current societal conditions call for making it less acceptable
to threaten other people, not to mention to act violently. Treating most
threats as true threats seems like a significant step in the right direction.

30

